SURTASS LFA - EIS questions and comments
Questions and Comments regarding
the Draft OEIS and EIS
for SURTASS LFA Sonar
published in July 1999
August 2002 - The following is a brief history of the issue:
In 1995, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed suit against the US Navy for violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act, among others, due to the Navy's use of low-frequency active (LFA) sonar without seeking and obtaining a Letter of Authorization from National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to do so. Thus began the legal and public debate over whether the Navy should deploy this extremely loud sound source into the world's oceans, which at close range can kill marine mammals and at greater distances disrupt important biological behaviors. The letter below was ACS' response submitted during the Public Comment period that ended October 28, 1999.
In July 2002, despite thousands of comments from scientists, government officials, environmentalists and the general public, NMFS granted the Navy permission to use LFA sonar.
Get the facts. Read the following letter to learn why ACS opposes the LFA sonar.
Please see our LFA Action Alert page to read what YOU can do to help keep LFA sonar from killing the world's whales.
On behalf of the American Cetacean Society, I would like to take this opportunity to submit questions and comments regarding the Draft OEIS and EIS for SURTASS LFA Sonar published in July 1999 (and Technical Reports Nos. 1-3, dated February 1999, June 1999 and March 1999 respectively).
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In the interests of space and clarity, the following references are cited throughout this letter by their abbreviations.
Marine Mammals & Noise, Richardson, W.J. et al (1998) (referred to herein as "MM&N")
Proceedings: Workshop on the Effects of Anthropogenic Noise in the Marine Environment, 10-12 February 1998, Marine Mammal Science Program, Office of Naval Research (referred to herein as "WEANME")
SACLANTCEN Bioacoustics Panel, 15-17 June 1998
All text in quotes, unless otherwise noted, is taken from the DOEIS/EIS (referred to herein as "DEIS"). Italics are for emphasis.
Personal communications (as noted).
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The rationale behind selecting the two primary references in the analysis of the DEIS is the consensus acknowledgement of Richardson's work as the "bible" of underwater acoustic impacts on marine mammals, and our desire to balance that with the investigation into the effects of anthropogenic sound on the marine environment by the Marine Mammal Science Program, Office of Naval Research, via the Workshop cited above. It was admittedly surprising to find such widespread scientific agreement between these two prestigious sources regarding the effects of underwater low-frequency sound on marine organisms.
It was even more surprising to discover that the three Principal Investigators of the SRP (Drs. Clark, Tyack and Ellison) were participants in that Workshop. Yet despite the inclusion of the meager preliminary data from the SRP at the Workshop, the consensus from the Workshop was that there are still major data gaps and critical needs for more research, especially in the area of long-term effects from short-term observations. However, the Navy has based its DEIS entirely upon the SRP in utter disregard for the scientific literature, including that produced from its own Marine Mammal Science Program. We would like to know why, and respectfully ask the Navy to answer the following questions:
A. The Proposed Action  
"The purpose of the proposed action is to provide improved detection of quieter and harder-to-find foreign submarines, thereby meeting the Navy's need to maintain the ASW capability of its fleet." (DEIS, pg. ES-2) Several knowledgeable military sources say that not only does the U.S. not yet have this extremely quiet "stealth" capability, but Russia is at least 10 years, and China and other troublesome third world countries, 10-15 years away from having this technology, much less the ability to manufacture/build it to operational readiness. I.e., the need for haste for deployment appears to be nonexistent at this time. Considering the lack of imminent, or even mid-term threat, what justification does the Navy have for deployment of this indiscriminately damaging and potentially lethal system? We would also question the wisdom of deploying an extremely loud, large, slow-moving target that has no defense from enemy detection. With a reported sunk cost of $350 million (Los Angeles Times, Oct/14/99), what are the strategies for protecting the four proposed, very expensive SURTASS vessels from enemy attack? What are the ongoing costs in terms of materiel and personnel? Who gave the Navy permission to spend this kind of money for a system without providing an EIS prior to the current Draft, and without receiving NMFS and public approval? This low-frequency technology was deployed and used for years unbeknownst to the public without environmental impact statements being developed (hence the NRDC suit in 1994 re: ATOC). Where are the data from these years of use? Even the meager data gathered (and still not fully analyzed) from the 1997-98 SRP was defined as "biologically insignificant," yet the three Principal Investigators to this day cannot agree on what that definition is. (per Chris Clark, 8/19/99) What was their operative definition of "biologically insignificant"? Please provide statistical power analyses for "biologically insignificant" conclusions. For example, what is the sample size required to conclude at a 95% confidence level that there is no significant effect for each conclusion of "insignificant effect" vs. the sample size actually collected?
Regarding "biological significance": "It would be desirable to develop assays that are better indicators of fitness than are presently available, and apply these assays to animals over long periods of time - periods approaching the lifetime of animals. Without such indicators it will be virtually impossible to objectively quantify the impacts of noise. A potential problem exists in that the scientific view of biologically significant behavior focuses on sustainability of populations (e.g., numbers of animals surviving to a given age and their age-specific reproductive success) whereas the public perception, and the prevailing legal interpretation of the MMPA, focus on the well-being of individuals." (WEANME, pg. 85-86) Regarding the final approval process: "The decision-maker may approve the proposal even if it's not the environmentally preferable alternative." Then we would ask, what is the point of the DEIS process, public comment period, and "independent scientific review" if the decision can be made regardless of input? Who is the "decision-maker"? What accountability does this "decision-maker" have under the MMPA and ESA? Further, on what criteria does the Navy base any decision to escalate LFA operational level under "heightened threat conditions"? What is the Navy's definition of "heightened threat conditions"? It appears that the Navy has the horse running alongside the cart regarding the permitting process. The Endangered Species Act requires federal agencies, in this case the U.S. Navy, to "consult" with NMFS when a proposed action involves impacts to protected species. The DEIS lists NMFS as a "cooperating" agency. Why the difference in syntax? Is this "cooperation" the reason behind the Navy's "concurrent" application to NMFS (dated 10/22/99 in the Federal Register) for the "incidental take of marine mammals" before the Final EIS (FEIS) is even published?
Additionally, how can the NEPA-required "Biological Assessment" be derived from the DEIS, which won't include (according to the DEIS itself) the correction of "data inaccuracies," "clarifications of and modifications to analytical approaches," "inclusion of additional data or analyses," "modification of the proposed action or alternatives," or "simple acknowledgement of a comment," all of which would be included in the FEIS?
B. The Scientific Research Program (SRP)
The claim that no "harmful" or "biologically significant" responses were elicited in any of the three phases of the SRP is completely unsupported. The interruption of "singing" humpbacks and vocalizing fin and blue whales was deemed insignificant simply because the animals eventually resumed their calling. However, we know nothing of what these calls, or their interruption, mean: "Although animal communication appears to be more general in nature than for humans, it does not follow that communication in animals is less likely to be masked, and if masked is less likely to have a significant impact on an animal's fitness. The impact of blocking a signal will be a function of the importance of that particular communication." And: "Another common misunderstanding is that signals, such as a vocalization, carry one meaning. On the contrary, signals may carry multiple meanings, including identity (e.g., species, group dialect, individual), location, intention (e.g., aggression, submission, departure), and state (e.g., reproductive, nutritional). Most animal communication differs from human speech in the degree of referentiality, that is, an utterance referring to a particular object." And: "Without a more complete understanding of the passive and active use of sound for environmental sensing, as well as communication, we are limited in our ability to assess the potential impact from anthropogenic noise which might reduce an animal's hearing abilities or mask information carrying signals from conspecifics or other sound sources in the environment." (WEANME, pgs. 80 & 82) On what basis does the Navy conclude that no long-term harmful effects were produced during these tests? What kind of follow-up was conducted on those singers whose behaviors were interrupted? For how long? "Many studies of responses to human sounds, especially of cetacean behavior, have focused on the immediate response to sound. Measures typically include change in swimming direction, transitions from being at the surface to diving, and vocalization rates. While these changes are relatively easy to measure, our ability to interpret what these responses mean, either in the short- or long-term, is very difficult. Attempting to investigate behaviors that are of clearer biological importance should be a priority." (WEANME, pg. 88-89) And: "Failure to exhibit an externally observable reaction to a sound does not necessarily imply that the animal has not detected the sound, or that the sound had no effect on the animal." (WEANME, pg. 77) The SRP conducted tests up to a RL of 155 dB, at which level various responses were recorded in animals from all three phases of the SRP. How did the scientific team extrapolate that the threshold for risk of "non-injurious" harassment was 180dB RL? The DEIS is based solely on preliminary analyses. According to Chris Clark (SURTASS LFAS Open House in Seattle, October 5, 1999), a secondary analysis of SPR Phase III has revealed a significant correlation between change in humpback song duration and LFAS transmission. Why has the DEIS been released before complete analyses of the SRP are completed? Another example where preliminary analyses yield null results yet secondary analyses show a positive correlation can be found in a recent study performed by Peter Tyack. In this study, Dr. Tyack played back ship noise to right whales. The preliminary analysis of visually observed whale behavior indicated no significant change when the sound source was active. However, a secondary analysis that looked at data from orientation sensors that had been mounted on the whales revealed a strong correlation between change in whale orientation and sound source operation. (Chris Clark, October 5, 1999) One cannot state, with any confidence, even that there are no short-term effects from LFAS transmission if the whales were only observed part of the time. The use of time-depth recorders (TDRs) only provides gross position information, while passive listening only gives an indication of vocal activity. No attempt was made in the SRP to observe the spatial orientation of the whales while they were below the surface. What small-scale physical behavior did the whales exhibit when they were below the surface during transmission? Were sub-surface follow-through observations made? If not, why not? If so, where is the research showing this data?
I have already gone on record before the California Coastal Commission on May 12, 1999, with serious objections to and questions regarding the SRP Phase I study, on which I was hired as an observer. "Inconclusive" and not "biologically insignificant" would have been a more honest assessment of the SRP. The Quick Looks, which served as the basis for Technical Report No. 1, do nothing more than point out the deficiencies of this Program in terms of methodology, scope and long-term impacts. Contrary to what the DEIS asserts, the SRP doesn't prove there aren't long-term effects to short-term exposure, especially when the short-term exposure is caused by a permanent if intermittently transmitting fixture in the marine environment. Considering that the known scientific literature has repeatedly stated long-term effects cannot be derived from short-term observations, it appears the SRP was nothing more than an expensive and time-consuming attempt to mollify environmentalists and dupe the public.
C. The Process
Monitoring to prevent injury to marine life ostensibly will be accomplished by three methods: visual, passive and acoustic. However:
"Visual" does not address animals at night, animals directly beneath the ship, nor does it accommodate working in Beaufort 4 or worse sea conditions (although the DEIS optimistically states animals, apparently regardless of size, can be sighted in up to Beaufort 6 conditions, a statement I can personally attest to as being untrue, both from a shipboard and an aerial perspective). It also doesn't address the difficulty of sighting smaller animals, such as sea turtles, small cetaceans and small pinnipeds that are visible only in calm seas and less than 500 meters from on board ship. (WEANME, pg. 76)
Yet the DEIS claims a 70-99% sighting rate by "at least one" of the monitoring methods, even though three paragraphs before making this statement, it cited a 50% sighting failure rate for minke whales (an animal 23-30 feet in length with a prominent dorsal fin) by a visual survey crew. Further: "The detectability of seals in relation to distance from the observers began to decline well inside the safety radius [260m] (Harris et al., 1997; Richardson [ed.], 1998). In this project the sighting rate was notably higher at times with two observers than with one, indicating that many seals were being missed when just one observer was on watch. Visual monitoring at night was largely ineffective even using an image intensifier, and effective acoustical monitoring for seals was not practical. Furthermore, seals did not show sufficiently strong avoidance reactions to keep them outside the designated safety radius around the airgun array. Despite the inability to detect all seals present within the designated safety radius, seals were detected often, requiring 135 shutdowns of the airgun array during one 57-day operating season.
That constituted a significant operational disruption." (WEANME, pg. 98) This description was of a seismic survey. On what basis does the Navy make its claims to a "70-99%" sighting rate in view of the above scientific observations to the contrary? Are we to believe the United States Navy would tolerate frequent operational shutdowns, especially of a system that is presumably for the purpose of national defense, if a turtle swims within 1 km of the transmitting ship? "Passive" is not an effective mitigation since it relies on the animal vocalizing to be detected. Yet when whales are calling, even they aren't always recognized as whales by trained technicians! (WEANME, pg. 102) On what basis can the Navy guarantee that its technicians will recognize ALL whale calls, especially those that might be within 1 km of the transmitting ship? Which leaves only "active" - the use of loud ("approximately" 220dB), high-frequency sonar (30-40kHz), every 3-4 seconds with a "nominal" effective range of 2 km -- to detect and scare off "all marine mammals and possibly sea turtles" within 1 km of the sound source. This "HF/M3" (high-frequency marine mammal monitoring) sonar is more powerful than commercial "fish finders." Richardson et al, state that within these "middle" frequencies is where odontocetes have their best sensitivity and where their hearing is most acute. (MM&N, pg. 210) In other words, in order to keep animals from being pounded with ±248dB of LF sound, they'll need to be blasted with ±220dB of high-frequency sound? Is this what the Navy considers "mitigation"? "Ramping up" has been cited as an adjunct to mitigation. However: "Questions have been raised as to the efficacy of ramping up. There have been no specific studies to determine whether marine mammals really do move away during the ramp-up phase. It has been suggested that ramping up may do more harm than good if it allows mammals to gradually accommodate to sound levels that are in fact harmful. Some mammals might even be attracted by the initially weak sounds to move into the zone where exposure to the full-power sounds could be harmful. The frequent attraction of minke whales to slow-moving ships was mentioned as an indication that this type of effect is possible. On the other hand, there is anecdotal evidence that bowhead whales sometimes move away during the ramp-up phase of industrial noise playbacks or when exposed to a single airgun. Also, gray and bowhead whales often show some avoidance when exposed to industrial sounds from small projectors operating at full power. Ramping up or 'aversive stimulus' approaches - if effective - could operate without the need to detect the presence of marine mammals near the sound source. However, it should be recognized that the effectiveness of ramping up or aversive stimuli is likely to vary with species and situation. A more detailed review of experience during past and ongoing projects could be a useful starting point in designing tests of ramping up or aversive stimuli." (WEANME, pg. 112) On what scientific study is the Navy's ramp-up rationale based as a means for mitigation? The DEIS states: "Given the geographic extent of the proposed operating area, it is neither reasonable nor practical to model all the areas of the world's oceans in which the system might be operated." However, Richardson says: "Noise levels produced by human activities in underwater and terrestrial environments are determined not only by their acoustic power output but, equally important, by the local sound transmission conditions. A moderate-level source transmitting over an efficient path may produce the same received level at a given range as a higher-level source transmitting through an area where sound is attenuated rapidly, that is, over a 'lossy' path." And: "...the zone of acoustic influence for a given source of man-made noise can vary in radius 10-fold or more, depending on operating site and depth, and on seasonal changes in water properties." (MM&N, pg. 59) In other words, due to environmental variability, without direct measurements in every proposed operational area, there is no way to predict specific RL at a specific range for any given SL. For the DEIS to say that any marine life would not be exposed to more than a 180dB RL at a distance of 1km can neither be guaranteed nor mitigated. Additionally, how can human diver safety be guaranteed if there's the possibility of a "10-fold or more" increase in the effective range of sound transmission? I.e., how far would a SURTASS LFA sound source have to be from a mid-ocean dive site to guarantee no more than 145dB RL? Furthermore, what is the scientific basis for the 12-nautical-mile limit? In July 1994, a NOAA research vessel operating nearly 300 miles off the coast of Washington state received and recorded very loud sounds with a duration of 30 seconds on a 10-minute duty cycle, at frequencies between 150 and 260 Hz. It was later confirmed that the sounds were produced by a Navy vessel operating off San Diego during an experiment called "Magellan." It was also later determined, based on the estimated RL, that the SL was in the vicinity of 260 dB re 1 uPa in a one Hz band. (Dr. Mark McDonald, pers. comm..) I.e., RL in the neighborhood of 140 dB 1,600 kilometers away. How can the Navy assert that (1) the SURTASS RLs will be <180 dB 1km from the source and (2) the RLs will be <145 dB at "dive sites" where humans will be in the water? How does the Navy plan to mitigate mid-ocean, blue-water divers? The PE (Parabolic Equation) Model (ver. 3.4) relies on geometric inputs which use "stationary-point (source) depth" and "moving-point (receiver) depth." "Source levels of pulses from many sonars, airgun arrays and other nonexplosive sources of pulsed sounds are 230-255 dB re 1 µPa-m. Sounds from high-frequency sonars attenuate rather quickly in seawater. However received levels of low-frequency energy in the pulses from airgun arrays often exceed 160 dB re1 µPa-m out to distances of 5-10 km and can exceed 140 dB to distances of 15-30 km (Greene and Richardson 1988)." (MM&N, pg. 372) "Most workers have recognized that, even for a fixed projector source in a stratified ocean, the sound field can exhibit significant fluctuations in time, and may show large changes as functions of receiver depth, range and azimuth. For a moving source, a broadband source, or a range-varying environment, the dependencies can be compounded." (WEANME, pg. 106) Neither the SURTASS LFA source nor receiver is stationary. How can this PE model be applied to a towed-array system? The DEIS misrepresents Richardson by ignoring the fact that human TTS in air may not be directly extrapolated to marine mammals in water, nor is it certain that even human-in-air to human-in-water extrapolations can be made. (MM&N, pg. 370) And: "Extrapolation from terrestrial mammals to fishes and invertebrates may be even more difficult since the structure of the auditory system is so different between these groups." (WEANME, pg. 23) For the DEIS to claim that "the human model is the best objective foundation for an assessment" is not based on any known science. What is known is that there is no data regarding long-term, or "repeated exposure," effects on marine mammals. The foundation of the DEIS model is that "biologically important responses will be observed in a percentage of the population rather than in the entire population." This assumes responses are observable. Fright responses in some fish are manifested by the fish holding in a stationary position, i.e., no "observable response." Also: "No data on hearing sensitivity are available for baleen whales." (MM&N, pg. 332) So "observable responses" are meaningless since there is (1) no data to support at what level baleen whales "hear" LF sound and (2) no data on what baleen whale responses of any kind mean. Without field testing, there is no way to predict what "response" is appropriate for any given species under a given set of circumstances, much less whether that response is "biologically important." Therefore, on what scientific basis does the Navy base the "Effects of Repeated Exposure" and the "single ping equivalent (SPE)"? As an aside, we object to the use of the word "ping" for a transmission that has a duration of up to 100 seconds, which is in fact "intermittent" and not "brief." Furthermore, using the SPE theory, are we to believe that one 100-second ping at 180dB is equivalent to a nearly 2.78-hour exposure at 170dB? (100 seconds x 100 170dB pings / 60 seconds = 166.67 minutes) What are the mathematical and scientific bases for such fantastical assumptions? The DEIS says "...the tonal quality and duration of the signals are quite different from the sounds present in other studies" as if this statement is supposed to preclude all previous studies done on LF sound in the marine environment. If the SURTASS sonar is so different, and the "duration of the signals" so much longer, why hasn't the Navy run extensive, long-term tests of this sonar in every habitat it expects to occupy? Assuming for a moment the DEIS assertion that 180dB RL at 1 km is accurate (which means a 240dB source level), this means that RLs of up to160dB will be present to 10 km away. (And in 1000m deep water the volume contained within the 160dB sound field is approximately 310 cubic kilometers.) What this means in terms of real-world application (assuming what little data there is from the SRP is reliable) is that to a distance of 10 km from the ship (i.e., 310 square kilometers of surface area to monitor), marine mammals could be negatively impacted by levels of sonar yet untested, since SRP levels were only taken to 155dB RL. Again, this begs the question of what "science" was used to determine that 180dB as the criterion to determine levels of harassment when 155dB RLs were already high enough to elicit behavioral responses during the SRP? Re: the arbitrary nature of the 180dB "one number fits all" solution to establish a relative "safe" RL outside a given transmission area: "A point made by several participants [in the Workshop] was the need to avoid the "one number fits all" solution. An example of this is the 120 dB criterion in the NRC report (NRC, 1994). Obvious arguments against using a single number are species differences, differential effects of sound parameters, and surrounding environmental conditions such as the availability of prey in a particular area. It has been shown that animals will tolerate very high levels of sound in order to get food. Human military divers would tolerate high levels of sound in order to complete a mission. There are simply too many factors to permit use of a single number, even though it can be appealing because of its ease of incorporation into guidances or as a fallback due to lack of knowledge." (WEANME, pg. 66) Considering the RLs for the SRP were no higher than 155dB, on what basis does the Navy assert that 180dB RL is the one number that will "fit all" species and scenarios, and thus be "non-injurious"? The description of "non-serious injury" and "serious injury" are the legal equivalent of Class A harassment under the MMPA, or "take," which essentially means "dead" since there is no way to assume an animal lives after being injured or severely harassed. "The risk continuum estimates that 95 percent of the marine mammals exposed to a single ping at 180 dB could suffer a risk of non-injurious harassment. ...this is a conservative estimate." What definition of "conservative" is the Navy using? A 95% "take" rate of undetermined species - indeed of any one species - is unacceptable. How does the Navy justify a 95% "take" rate yet claim "negligible population consequences"? Furthermore, "non-injurious harassment" is considered in the DEIS as having occurred only if the animal hears LF sound), if the animal incurs a "prolonged" reaction to the LF sound, and if a "significant behavioral change in a biologically important activity" is observed. The DEIS only says "primarily feeding and breeding" are essential to the reproductive success of the animal. It does not mention migration, the ability to communicate with conspecifics, predator detection, prey detection, etc., ALL of which affect the "reproductive success of the animal" in the long-term. On what scientific basis does the Navy dismiss all non-hearing effects of low-frequency sound on marine mammals? The entire text on pgs. 4.2-27 through 4.2-29 is nothing but speculation and assumption based on misquotes and deliberate misleads. For example: "Ridgway's measurements were made with 1-second signals, but SURTASS LFA sonar signals range in duration from 6 to 100 seconds." This is comparing apples and oranges since Ridgway's experiment was with high-frequency sound (20-70 kHz) and SURTASS LFA is low-frequency (ostensibly 100-500 Hz), thus there is no way to extrapolate odontocete (HF) TTS to mysticete (LF) TTS, much less PTS, based on signal duration of two entirely different types of sounds. These two pages, in fact, are riddled with "assuming that" and "this suggests" and "if" and "may exist," etc. There is no data in any study to support the claims made in these pages. In fact: "At this point, however, virtually no data exist to specifically address this question. One reason that this is such a pressing issue is that PTS onset cannot be extrapolated from TTS data." (WEANME, pg. 45) On what scientific basis does the Navy make their assertions regarding TTS to PTS?
The Navy states Urick's (a Naval researcher) 1983 definition of ambient noise as: "the sound of the sea itself." Yet shipping noise is the "single biggest contributor to 'acoustic smog' in the ocean" (Clark, 8/19/99). Richardson, et al, agree, defining it as "the residual background sound exclusive of components from sources of specific interest," and "environmental background noise." This is critically important because "the sound of the sea itself" is no longer an adequate description of the present conditions of the ocean and has a direct bearing on the advisability of adding yet an even louder (than ambient), potentially lethal sound into the mix.
D. Impacts to Marine Fauna and Flora
Jellyfish, zooplankton as well as squid, octopus, lobster, shrimp and crab are excluded from the species of potential impact. Why? Simply because a marine organism can't hear LF sound doesn't preclude non-hearing impacts. "No data" does not mean "no impact." Humans also cannot hear infrasonic sound, but that doesn't mean there aren't multiple non-hearing impacts. And indeed there are, particularly for any organisms that contain air cavities (sinuses, ears, swimbladders, etc.). (WEANME, pg. 63) We are sure that the Navy is familiar with the U.S. Army tests of LF sound on land-based human subjects who exhibited, among other things, dizziness and vomiting as a result of the exposure. "High-power sonars emit sufficient energy to cause concern about possible hearing damage and nonauditory physical effects on human divers nearby (Smith 1985; Section 10.6.4). Recently unofficial accounts have been circulating concerning negative diver reactions at very long distances from a specialized high-power low-frequency military sonar." (MM&N, pg. 303) On what scientific basis does the Navy exclude consideration of any marine life from non-hearing effects of LFA sonar? Phytoplankton is not addressed at all, nor are any other marine flora. Since the effects of LF sound on marine flora are unknown, this must be considered and tested, from the single-celled, silica-based diatom to giant kelp forests -- all irreplaceable links in the food web, none of which are gelatinous and all of which provide sound impedance. Why isn't this critical area of the marine ecosystem being studied? And why isn't this addressed in the DEIS, particularly in light of the Navy's intent to move away from "blue water" strategies and more into the "littoral zone"? Where data is missing or insufficient on one species, "comparable data" for "a related species" was used. Which species specifically? There are very few instances in the scientific literature where data from one species can be accurately extrapolated to another without much qualification. In fact: "Although these data support the idea that fish could be affected by anthropogenic sounds, only a few studies give any insight into this problem. Moreover, there is very substantial interspecific variation in the structure of the ears of fishes, and how sound gets to the ear. Thus it may be almost impossible to extrapolate results between fish species that have very different ear structures. Moreover, whereas many fish species could be expected to move rapidly from areas of high ensonification, there are other species that move very little in times of stress, and their potential exposure to damaging anthropogenic sounds could be much higher than in species that move rapidly and readily." (WEANME, pg. 29) On what scientific basis does the Navy extrapolate data from fewer than a half-dozen fish species and claim "no impact" to the more than 25,000 others? The only data cited for hearing thresholds in the "American lobster" is from a 1970 study, which was stated to be "about 150 dB." Considering the lack of more recent data using more accurate equipment, this is hardly an empirical statement. Also, the exclusion, then, of decapods and cephalopods because of their allegedly high hearing thresholds and, in the case of lobster because of their predilection for the coastal zone, is also at odds with the ONR's own research, which says: "This research was driven by the US Navy's doctrine of moving into the littoral (coastal) zone and the Navy's decision elected to produce an environmental impact statement (EIS) regarding use of the system. This expanded the impact of the LFA system from military divers and deep water to recreational divers and shallow water. It was noted by Popper that this significantly increased fish exposure to low frequency sound because fish are more numerous in the littoral region than in the blue water areas used for traditional operations." (WEANME, pg. 59) (Note: Arthur N. Popper is professor in the Dept. of Biology, U. of Maryland, College Park, MD, and Team Leader on Hearing Physiological Effects for the WEANME workshop.) On what scientific basis does the Navy exclude impacts to shallow-water fish species?
Re: the regeneration of hair cells that are damaged by LF sound: Even where hair cells are regrown, "...such recovery does not mean that the replacement hair cells are sending the same kinds of information to the brain as were sent by the original hair cells, or that there is full recovery of function in either birds or fishes." (WEANME, pg. 29) Again, non-hearing impacts are not taken into account in the discussion of resonance in bony fishes. Resonance affects orientation, brain function, etc., in humans. There is no data to support that it does not occur in bony fishes as well. Resonance of any membrane can result in hemorrhage and rupture, whether or not the resonance of, for instance in some species, a swimbladder affects the animal's hearing. On what scientific basis does the Navy conclude that there are no non-hearing impacts to bony fishes? For fish species with swimbladders, 50% mortality occurred in the brown trout at 170dB from 95-100 Hz; bass and whiting, at 176 dB at 95 Hz. "No studies have looked at the long-term or repetition effects of sub-lethal blasts on these fish or the possibility of resonance for continuous signals interfering with sound production of the swimbladder for reproduction rituals or warning of predators." Also, "Another organ that is dramatically affected by high intensity impulse sound is the fish eye. Blindness and hemorrhage commonly occur at sound pressure levels of 220 dB SPLPeak." (WEANME, pg. 63) "Laboratory studies report that low frequency sound can affect egg viability and that growth rates of fish and invertebrates are affected by high intensity impulse sounds (Banner and Hyat, 1973; Kostyuchenko, 1973; Lagardere, 1982; referenced in NRC, 1994)." (WEANME, pg. 64) On what scientific basis does the Navy assert that there will be no impacts to fish with swimbladders? Considering the Navy's strategy to move into the littoral zone, on what scientific basis does the Navy assert there will be no impact to fish eggs and larvae? Or to invertebrates? Re: the data for the few species referred to in the available literature: So few data exist as to not be able to (a) determine impacts at 180 dB; (b) no long-term data exist for any fish species. And most damning is in the DEIS itself: "...it needs to be noted that there may be a difference between avoidance and injury to the fish. In other words, the fish may remain in the area of high intensity sound even as their sensory receptors are being injured. This is possible since the normal fright response of a particular fish species might be to not move rather than swim away. Hence in the presence of a frightening intense sound, the fish may not move." Which only begs the question: How can any impacts to any fish species be mitigated? The same question can be applied to marine mammals since we don't know enough about their individual behaviors (and what they mean) to be able to know whether a stationary whale is "unbothered," if it its fright response is to not move, or if it has in fact been injured. Considering our vast lack of knowledge of individual marine mammal behaviors, on what scientific basis does the Navy assert that any impacts to any marine mammal species can be mitigated? "Noise-related depletions of forage fish stocks could have a significant ripple effect on members of higher trophic levels (e.g., toothed whales, large sharks, tunas and billfishes). Conversely, noise that keeps predators out of an area may result in dramatic alterations in the abundance of certain prey species that would not otherwise dominate the ecosystem." (WEANME, pg. 88) Why are LFA-related effects on forage fish stocks not addressed in the DEIS? No sound studies have been done on sharks more recently than 1988 (per the DEIS) and the rest of the studies cited are over twenty years old. Considering that most species of shark are known to have extreme sensitivity to LF sound, and the fact that most of the nearly 400 species are under increasing pressure if not endangered from over-exploitation, more current and more thorough research is warranted. No mention is made in the DEIS of whale shark, great white, mako, tiger or blue sharks; why? "Data are available for only three or four of the more than 25,000 extant species of bony fish. What is more, the data on other marine organisms, such as elasmobranchs (sharks & rays) and agnathans (lamprey and hagfish), is non-existent." (WEANME, pg. 47) Furthermore, the DEIS states in one section that even in the old studies, levels of 111dB,123dB,154dB and sudden increases of >20 dB caused withdrawal responses, yet two paragraphs later claims that no non-serious injury would occur unless the animal was well inside the 180dB sound field. On what scientific basis does the Navy assert that a shark would have to be "nearly co-located with the vessel" to be subject to "serious injury"? Once again, the DEIS is completely ignoring the lack of data for impacts up to 180dB and the fact that no long-term effects are addressed. The zone of influence (ZOI) of no more than 1 km is total speculation and completely unsupported by the data. The DEIS goes on to say that "it is impossible to estimate accurately the numbers of fish, sharks and threatened/endangered fish that could be in the ZOI at the onset of SURTASS LFA sonar transmission because of the variability in the distribution, abundance, and density of fish stocks in the open ocean." We agree. Not to mention the fact that sharks (and fish) are invisible to passive and visual monitoring, and unless they are blasted with 220dB of high-frequency sound using active sonar, there is no way to mitigate their presence either in co-location with or within 1 km of the transmission ship. For the DEIS to say in one sentence that "the potential impact may be greater due to the shark's attraction or repulsion behavioral response to sudden onsets of moderate amplitude sounds (less than 160dB)" and in the following that "however, the possibility of a shark being harmed in the 180dB-ZOI is negligible" is an oxymoron at best, and an outright falsehood at worst. On what rationale can the DEIS state that the shark's potential for being impacted by LF sound is insignificant because there are so many species that are so widely dispersed? According to the DEIS, all porpoise species (phocoenids) are disqualified from consideration because of their relatively shallow water habitat, as are mustelids (otters). The DEIS also disqualified 19 orders of fishes found in inshore waters, even though there is no data whatsoever on effects of even 145dB "diver safe" LF sound on these taxa. (WEANME, pg. 59) Considering the Navy's current strategy to move more into the littoral zone, on what scientific basis are phoecoenids, mustelids and the "19 orders of fish" excluded from being impacted by LFA sound? What specifically are the "19 orders" that were disqualified? The "Potential for Indirect Effects" concerns itself primarily with fish stocks, which it asserts would not be "altered for more than a few hours. Fish from surrounding areas would quickly repopulate the small area affected." There is NO data to support that other fish will rush in to take the place of fish killed outright or displaced. On what scientific studies of which species can the Navy extrapolate that if a food source is displaced, another will move in to compensate? All seabirds are disqualified from consideration, even though mallards used as a surrogate for diving seabirds experienced "extensive lung hemorrhage and a 50% prevalence of liver and kidney damage" in tests done as long ago as 1973 (WEANME, pg. 63). There is no reference for further seabird studies since that time. While it is acknowledged that there may be little cause for concern for impacts to diving seabirds because of their short dive times, this does not translate to "no impact" since it does not address the impacts to seabirds via fish stocks, on which seabirds are completely dependent. However: "The effects of anthropogenic sounds on other aquatic species, such as reptiles, aquatic birds, invertebrates, etc., is totally unknown... [but]... is likely to be limited due to their short time under water. Of course, if the sound levels are sufficiently intense, even a short exposure could be problematic." (WEANME, pg. 29) Also, "The concern for hearing loss in these animals (aquatic birds, reptiles or invertebrates) needs to be as great as it is for marine mammals since many of these species are of economic importance to humans and/or keystones in the marine food chain." (WEANME, pg. 49) On what scientific basis can the Navy claim "no impact" to seabirds, who are wholly dependent upon fish stocks for survival? The deployment of SURTASS vessels is stated to be far enough outside Arctic and Antarctic waters to have no impact on those environments. Is it really logical to assume that there is no potential threat from the polar areas of the world? Is the Navy saying that submarines don't travel under the ice? Aside from any potential threat, this is of special concern since any sound traveling in the deep sound channel will be stronger and closer to the surface in polar regions than it is elsewhere, thus increasing the likelihood of high-level, LF sound reaching into these fragile environments. Sound propagation in polar waters is far more efficient than in the open ocean, including 10-15 dB "above expected levels," according to Richardson, in convergence zones and in the shallower manifestation of the extremely efficient deep sound channel. Is it not logical, therefore, based on current scientific knowledge, to expect LF sound to be "above expected levels" and thereby impacting these nutrient-rich and populated regions? Why, then, are the marine mammals inhabiting them not included in any impact scenario, especially the highly endangered bowhead whale, as well as the threatened beluga whale, who, contrary to what the DEIS says, is not exclusively an Arctic inhabitant and has been known to travel as far south as 42 degrees north latitude in the Atlantic? There is no data at all on non-hearing impacts to sea turtles, and what little hearing data there is indicates very low thresholds of hearing sensitivity. Mitigation will be virtually impossible for these small, highly migratory, pelagic, hard-to-see animals. "...Richardson reported that the sightability of ringed seals was near zero beyond a range of 500m from the ship." (WEANME, pg. 76) Visual sighting of the much smaller turtles will be probably less than that, and even then in Beaufort 3 or less sea state. For the DEIS to say most species of turtles are "coastal" is untrue. They do spend much of their time in coastal regions and even on land during nesting season. However, what little is known of all seven sea turtle species indicates that most of them have trans-oceanic migrations or travel far into ocean basins foraging for food, and this is where most of their lives are spent. Yet unlike the sharks, that are far more plentiful and equally widely dispersed, sea turtle impacts are considered by the DEIS to be insignificant due to their low numbers and wide dispersal. I.e., whether a species is plentiful or scarce has no bearing on potential impact as far as the DEIS is concerned. The Navy can't have it both ways. On what scientific basis does the Navy claim that no species of sea turtle, all of which have stocks that are threatened or endangered, will be impacted by LFA sonar? Humpbacks are erroneously classed as a "coastal" species. In the north Pacific, this species migrates annually from the sub-arctic directly to Hawaii. The Navy's arbitrary classification of cetaceans into "pelagic" and "coastal" species is unknown to science and is done solely for the convenience of this DEIS to help pigeon-hole species into various modeling scenarios. Blue whales are no more solely "pelagic" than all humpbacks are "coastal." An irrelevant exercise which unnecessarily - deliberately? - adds to the confusion in an already mind-numbingly repetitive and frequently obtuse document. On what scientific basis does the Navy separate cetacean species into "coastal" and "pelagic" classifications? Please cite the source(s) for this assertion. Richardson says that killer whales can hear in the low frequency range, down to 500 Hz at 100dB. (MM&N, pg. 209) Dr. David Bain has said that the frequency range is even lower, to 350 Hz (pers. comm. to Joe Olson). The DEIS claims that killer whales hear at .5kHz and above. Is this why this species was excluded from all impact studies in this DEIS despite their ubiquitous presence in the world's oceans? Why aren't killer whales included in any of the AIM modeling scenarios? They are highly migratory. In the eastern Pacific alone, two varieties are pelagic (transients and offshores), both of which are dependent upon marine mammals for food, and a third variety (residents) feeds on salmon, another highly migratory animal and, in many species, pelagic for most of its life before returning to its spawning streams. Why are only North Pacific site estimates referenced as "for Alternative 1/Alternative 2 cases"? What does this mean? Why are there no beaked whales shown for Sites 8 and 13? The DEIS statement that there are "anecdotal" reports of sperm whales being sensitive to man-made transient noise is only half the truth: the paper incompletely cited by the DEIS really said: "...sperm whales exposed to strong pulses from submarine sonars in the eastern Caribbean became silent, interrupted their activities, and moved away (Watkins et al 1985a, 1993)." (MM&N, pg. 302) (Note: Kurt Fristrup was co-author of the 1993 paper and Chris Clark's colleague on the SRP.) What is the reason for the misquote? Additionally, we understand sperm whales were cut from the SRP as one of the focal species to be studied. These are among the most pelagic and deepest diving cetaceans. On what basis did the Navy exclude from the SRP a species that is more likely than most to be impacted by LFA sonar? If for budgetary reasons, how does the Navy justify deployment of a system that is vastly more expensive than the research to help determine the safe operational limits, if any, of the system? "Long-term, cumulative effects of anthropogenic sound could be the most important aspects of sound to marine mammal populations." And: "In addition, the behavioral responses animals make to single, intense sounds, such as turning away or startle response, may be less biologically significant than responses that result from a lifetime of exposure. The emphasis of future research should be on responses that are biologically significant, and these responses may be biologically significant only upon cumulative repetition over relatively long periods of time. One of the great challenges to developing a behavioral metric of acoustic exposure will be to design short term, acute experiments that provide a basis for estimating what the long-term effects will be." (WEANME, pg. 79) Why has the Navy not addressed long-term effects of low-frequency sound to marine mammal stocks? Why isn't even the potential for such effects built into the DEIS models used? The DEIS again misquotes Richardson when it states that "...studies of human hearing indicate that the normal process of hearing loss with age can be accelerated by chronic exposure to sounds 80dB above the absolute threshold of hearing." And: "If the '80dB above threshold' rule is valid for odontocetes..." What Richardson really said was: "We emphasize that the applicability of the '80dB above threshold' criterion to marine mammals is unknown. A criterion based on human hearing in air may not apply to marine mammals in water. Indeed, it is not certain that it even applies to humans in water." (MM&N, pg. 370) Furthermore: "As discussed earlier there is very good evidence that signals 80dB above threshold are generally capable of causing TTS, at least in humans and experimental animals, when there is exposure for an extended period of time. The question then arises as to whether this value can be taken 'as is' and also whether this value can be extrapolated to animals in the aquatic environment. With regard to the first question, it must be pointed out that there are numerous caveats when suggesting an 80dB level for TTS. The presence, and extent, of TTS depends upon a number of factors including sound spectrum, duration, signal duty cycle, rise-time, etc. Thus, without a better description of the stimulus, the basis for using 80 dB (or any other single number) becomes questionable, and so its applicability to a broad range of situations is likely to not be useful." And: "Moreover, the effects of such sounds on invertebrates, eggs and larvae, and plankton, is not only unknown, but completely unpredictable." (WEANME, pg. 47) On what scientific principle does the Navy use the "80dB criterion" as a basis for extrapolating from humans for purposes of determining TTS in marine mammals? In an attempt to justify the use of 180dB RLs, the DEIS reveals its ignorance of basic cetacean biology when it states, "Some of the highest RLs would come from the animals themselves." And: "It is very unlikely that an auditory system would evolve such that the loud calls produced by an individual would immediately cause a permanent loss of hearing sensitivity." However, as is easily found in the literature: "Some whales and dolphins have been documented to produce sounds with source levels as high as 180 to 220dB re 1 µPa at 1 m (Au, 1993; Richardson et al., 1995). Animals, including humans, commonly produce sounds which would produce discomfort if they were received at the ear at levels equal to the emitted level. Mammal ears are protected generally from self-generated sounds by both intervening tissues (head shadow and impedance mismatches) as well as active mechanisms (eardrum and ossicular tensors)." (WEANME, pg. 27) What source(s) did the Navy use to determine that cetaceans cannot be injured or impacted by external sounds equal to or louder than the ones they themselves produce? Furthermore, on what scientific basis does the Navy assert a maximum safe RL of 145dB RL for human divers but a maximum safe level of 180dB RL for marine mammals? What was the DEIS' source(s) for cetacean stock assessments? The DEIS says "derived through literature searches." The fidelity of the data is extremely important. Yet there is no explanation other than the tables themselves, which, if are taken at face value have, according to the best scientific data available, far over-estimated population sizes. E.g., blue whales at 19,000 animals? Humpbacks at 90,000 animals? There is no basis in science for these figures. Specifically, what "literature" was consulted? According to Table 4.2-12, "Annual Estimates of Percentages of Marine Mammal Stock Populations Potentially Affected," 4.03% of the northern right whale in the eastern north Pacific are estimated to suffer potential "non-serious injury" (although the table gives RLs of both "<180dB" and ">180dB"). What is interesting about this percentage is that only fewer than a dozen right whales have been sighted in recent years in the north Pacific, yet they are attributed a 4.03% probability of impact. Compare this to the gray whale, whose population is known to be above 20,000 animals, only 3.43% of which is predicted will be impacted. On what basis does the Navy justify a larger percentage of impact to a severely depleted and endangered species (right whale) than it does to a species in recovery (gray whale)? It would appear that there is a serious flaw in either the population sources used or in the modeling process itself, which calls into question the veracity of any other data in this table. Additionally, if a species was "not modeled" (NM) due to low population figures, how can a percentage for impact even be assessed? Isn't zero times any other number, no matter how low, still zero? a. However, if we do give the DEIS the benefit of the doubt regarding the figures used for populations and modeling, the "two sources at one site" scenario will have even more serious consequences. With double the duty cycle, the percentages of affected populations are also doubled, although only a 75% of the doubled figure is used (see Oman model below for the "rationale" and to justify the use of the "75%" figure). And using the EIS' "95% take" rate, the percentages of affected populations in just the eastern north Pacific is staggering: 12.5% for blue whales, 5.14% for grays (but 6.04% for the virtually nonexistent right whale), 3.82% for humpbacks, 14.82% for northern sea lion, and 16.08% for northern elephant seal. However, in the eastern North Atlantic, the blue whale can expect a phenomenal 24% of the population to be impacted. Even using the above "conservative" figures, how can the Navy reconcile significant percentages of "take" rates and yet maintain that there are no overall impacts of LFA sonar to marine mammal stocks? The DEIS selected the Gulf of Oman as a representative scenario to test the "two sources at one site" modeling, which resulted in not a doubling of percentages of impact but ostensibly indicated that 75% of the doubled figure was more "real." However, as Table 4.2-14 shows, there were so few animals on which to base modeling percentages, it isn't surprising the 75% figure was proposed. Why did the Navy use an area with a small sample size and lower diversity than any one of the eastern North Pacific sites? This calls into doubt the validity of using the 75% figure, especially for the "two sources at one site" scenario as a criterion for any and all sites. Again, the "one number fits all" solution has been used as a fallback position due to lack of knowledge. The section called "Biological Context" attempts to take the percentages discussed above and apply to the animals' life cycle: "Some animals at risk might have a reduced probability of breeding during the 20 days of transmissions. As a hypothetical example, half of the animals at risk lose about one quarter of the breeding season; this would represent a loss of between five percent and one percent of their lifetime reproductive potential." This, of course, assumes one source/one site. Apply the two sources/one site possibility, and there is a 2-10% negative lifetime reproductive impact, which would be devastating to endangered species such as blue, humpback, right whales, etc. On what scientific basis does the Navy assert that even the smallest percentage of negative "reproductive potential" will not be disastrous for endangered species of marine mammals? The impact on foraging efficiency is estimated at 25% (again, one source/one site), which represents a 5% reduction in food intake for the season. This much of a difference could certainly affect migration success. But it could mean 10% with two sound sources. Again, this is unacceptable risk for species that are threatened or endangered. Indeed, even the one-source/one site percentage is unacceptably high, especially for lactating females or juvenile animals, who are the most vulnerable to any changes in their food supply. On what scientific basis does the Navy assert that a 5-10% reduction in food intake will not negatively impact species in general, and lactating females and juvenile animals in particular? Both of these population impacts are based on the assumption that the animals will be "passing" the transmission ship and won't remain in an ensonified zone for very long. However, this is an erroneous assumption, considering that migrating animals could be moving synchronously with the moving SURTASS sound source as much as 6 months out of every year (3 months each migratory direction).
The DEIS states: "...the 20 percent (maximum) duty cycle of SURTASS LFA sonar transmissions implies that the cumulative effect will be less than for continuous sounds, but determining how conservative this assumption may be is not possible." Richardson, et al, disagrees: "If either the animals or the noise sources move, an individual animal would encounter a noise source more often. The consequences of increasingly frequent disturbance are uncertain but presumably negative." And: "The cumulative effects on marine mammals of noise from multiple human activities have not been studied specifically, let alone the cumulative effects of noise plus nonacoustic phenomena." (MM&N, pg. 405) Further: "The dimensions of these mammal [pinniped and cetacean] concentrations are often smaller than the dimensions of the area ensonified by a single site of human activity, or by a single passing vessel or aircraft.
In these cases, a significant portion of a marine mammal population might be exposed to noise from a single noisy activity." (MM&N, pg. 389) I.e., assuming a 240dB SL, the RL at 10 kilometers is 160dB (which is 5 dB above the highest "tested" level used by the SRP, and at which there were observed reactions). This translates to 2,094 cubic kilometers of ocean ensonified by LFA at levels from 160dB-240dB. Based on Dr. McDonald's recording cited above, any given RL boundary could easily extend well beyond the estimated limits, thus affecting a much larger three-dimensional geographic area.
Since marine mammals are rarely, if ever, stationary themselves, on what scientific basis does the Navy assert that fewer animals will be impacted by a mobile transmission source than if the source was stationary? And on what scientific basis does the Navy claim that, given the large size of the ensonified area, significant portions, if not all individuals, of any given stock of animals will not be impacted? Masking potential for odontocetes and pinnipeds is dismissed as "minor and temporary." The DEIS itself states "LF hearing has not been studied in many odontocete species," and it uses unsupportable hedge words like "may" and "it is anticipated" when referring to potential for masking. The DEIS then states that "the same general principles" were applied to pinnipeds that were used for mysticetes (please note: there ARE no data) and odontocetes (for which there are very limited data, and even then only regarding the radius of audibility). Again, because there are NO data available for pinnipeds, the hedge words used by the DEIS are "could be" and "may." I.e., neither the scientific community nor the Navy knows the potential of masking by LF sound, yet the Navy still claims any impacts to these taxa are only "minor and temporary." Moreover, this masking effect would have a direct impact on the ability of blue whales, for instance, to use seamounts for navigational purposes, something Chris Clark has stated they do in order to find their way across ocean basins. (Clark radio interview, Talk of the Nation Science Friday, April 1999) On what scientific basis does the Navy claim any masking potential for odontocetes and pinnipeds to be only "minor and temporary"? Low frequency noise can have masking effects on signals whose frequencies are two octaves higher than the source frequency. (Dr. David Bain, pers. comm., 5 October 1999) This means that the effects of SURTASS LFA sonar on species with vocal and/or hearing ranges up to 5 kHz need to be studied. What studies has the Navy undertaken to ensure that those species whose vocal and/or hearing ranges are outside the frequency range of LFA sonar are not impacted?
"One should not assume that the ability to detect a sound in noise is the only relevant variable. To understand how environmental noise might affect acoustic communication, laboratory tests must be conducted on how noises of different types affect not only the detection but also the discrimination, and identification of species-specific vocalizations. Such laboratory data are critical for understanding the full effect of noise on acoustic communication and for developing reasonable guidelines for noise abatement. It is one thing to hear a voice, and it quite another to understand what is said. ...acoustic communication abilities can be divided into three broad categories. The ability to detect a signal involves only being able to tell whether a sound occurred or not. The ability to discriminate or distinguish whether a sound is different from another sound requires yet a higher signal-to-noise ratio than simple detection. And identification, or the ability to recognize a specific, biologically relevant signal, may require even high signal-to-noise ratios." And: "The list of incomplete knowledge in the area of noise effects on marine mammals is staggering. We basically don't have any data on the importance of communication for survival and on long-term effects on an individual and an entire population." (WEANME, pgs. 38 & 41) "Potential Biological Removal (PBR) Level" assertion that "SURTASS LFA sonar will not cause the direct removal of any animals from the marine mammal stocks" is wishful thinking. Considering the already discussed inefficacy of "Monitoring and Mitigation," unknown numbers of animals (marine mammals but especially fish) will inevitably be co-located with the SURTASS vessel. This assertion also completely ignores the documented 1996 stranding of Cuvier's beaked whales where a NATO exercise (using a U.S. Navy ship transmitting LF sound) was conducted. In typical political double-speak, the report didn't say the strandings were due directly to LF transmissions (even though it did correlate three strandings with three specific transmissions), but it did rule out all "natural occurring phenomena" as the cause. (SACLANTCEN) There are numerous reports of LF-related strandings worldwide, but due to the classified nature of military activities, these reports will be difficult to substantiate. If it weren't for a report by a Greek scientist in Nature, the Cuvier's stranding would have remained unknown to the general public. On what scientific basis does the Navy claim that there will be no immediate deaths of marine mammals by LFA sonar? Where is the research indicating RLs from 240dB-180dB will not cause immediate death or severe injury leading to death? At what decibel level will a marine mammal suffer disorientation, PTS or other injury serious enough to interfere with foraging, nursing, migrating, prey evasion or breeding capability, all of which will lead to death not only of individuals but of entire stocks? The "Potential Cumulative Impacts" section of the DEIS states: "Implementation of the proposed action is expected not to have any significant cumulative effects on fish, sea turtle, or marine mammal species." Even though, as stated above, the long-term (cumulative) effects of LF sound on marine life is unknown to science. "Long term cumulative effects may be difficult to measure, or appear innocuous in the short term, but which may, over periods of years or decades result in biologically significant impact on individuals and populations." (WEANME, pg. 76) On what scientific basis does the Navy assert that there will be no "significant cumulative effects" on fish, sea turtles or marine mammals? What does the Navy mean by "significant"? What cumulative effect does the Navy consider "insignificant"?
E. Impacts to Humans
"The possibility of sound increasing bubble burden for humans is of significant concern given the decompression obligation of humans." And: "Consideration of low frequency rectified diffusion was investigated given that bubbles will continue to enlarge until they reach their resonant frequency, i.e., the lower the frequency the larger the resonant size. For example, a 250 Hz signal will result in a theoretical bubble growth of up to 1 cm. The large size of these bubbles increases the potential for blocking medium sized arteries. Theoretical modeling by (Crum and Mao, 1993; 1996) demonstrated that bubble growth in the frequency range of 250-1000 Hz requires supersaturation and high sound pressure level to reach large diameters. Bubble growth theoretically reaches capillary-size (10mm) within a few minutes at sound pressure levels above 190 dB SPL. (WEANME, pg. 64) And: "Recently, human divers have reported discomfort when exposed to sounds from a powerful low-frequency (LF) sonar at very long ranges. Physiological studies to investigate the basis for this discomfort are under way in the U.S.A. Some non-acoustic effects may be elicited by stimulation of Pacinian corpuscles (Woolley and Ellison 1993; ARPA 1995), which are mammalian sensory structures sensitive to LF vibration. Also, Crum and Yi Mao (1994) estimate that human divers and marine mammals exposed to LF sound at levels >210dB re 1 mPa may be at risk from acoustically enhanced growth of gas bubbles in body fluids. If some military sonar systems have significant nonauditory effects on humans, there is reason for concern about their effects on marine mammals. Results of ongoing research in this area should be made public to better define the implications for marine mammals." (MM&N, pg. 382) Has the Navy done any testing on human divers to determine rates of bubble growth from LF sound? Has the Navy made this research available to the public? If not, why not? The DEIS states that studies on the impacts on human divers was initiated by complaints stemming from a French diver in 1993 who reported "annoying LF sound" off Corsica and Marseilla in the western Mediterranean Sea. However, no such studies were initiated stemming from complaints of divers and swimmers in Hawaiian waters during Phase III of the SRP Jan-Mar 1998. In fact, all complaints were ignored, including those documented up by reports from the attending physician in one particular case of severe injury. Why were all so-called "anecdotal" reports from SRP Phase III ignored? Why were no follow-up studies done for those humans who reported suffering ill effects from having been in the water during transmission? Additionally, the justification for operating at 145dB or lower levels near known dive sites flies in the face of the Navy Environmental Health Center (1997) report, which specifies that "130dB SPL at dive sites was the maximum level allowed in the current sea research program. This number was based on the minimum threshold for vibrotactile sensing of an underwater sound between 100 and 500 Hz." (WEANME, pg. 66) On what scientific basis did the Navy determine that 145dB was "safe" for humans in water? The 145dB level is an arbitrary 3dB lower than the level at which an aversion reaction by some tested divers was exhibited. However, the DEIS goes on to say that the "distance of the 145dB sound field from the SURTASS LFA sonar vessel is unique to each operation site and/or scenario due to the high variability in underwater sound propagation characteristics." Therefore, in order to guarantee no higher than the 145dB "safety level," direct measurements of each potentially affected dive site need to be taken simply because of this shallow-water (<100 feet) "variability." Moreover, the distance of ANY sound field from the LFA sonar vessel is unique to each operational site, whether that site is in shallow or deep water, and accordingly should be directly measured, as should any species inhabiting or potentially inhabiting an operational site, since there are few if ANY relevant data on marine life as a whole. (MM&N, pg. 427) On what scientific basis does the Navy assert that no higher than 145dB will be realized without studying each "dive site" so the sound propagation characteristics will be known? How does the Navy plan to guarantee diver safety in dive sites currently unknown to the Navy? How does the Navy play to guarantee "blue-water" diver safety? What effects will LFA sonar have on public and private mid-ocean research and researchers?
F. Legal and Financial Impacts
The fatal flaw in all the modeling and mitigations posited by this DEIS is that there is simply not enough data on the effects of LF sound in the marine environment for the Navy to be able to make any of the claims it's making, and long-term effects are unknown to science and therefore cannot be extrapolated from short-term observations. "This is a major data need, since it is the long-term effects on distribution and reproductive success that are most important. It is unclear whether the presence or absence of strong short-term behavioral reactions is a good indicator of long-term consequences. Research that can provide insight into long-term effects of noise on any species of marine mammal is a high priority." (MM&N, pg. 443) What effort is the Navy expending toward the study of long-term effects of LFA sound on the marine environment? Shipping noise is the dominant contributor to LF marine noise. If commercial ships were quieter, ambient ocean noise level would be substantially less, which would in turn enable the use of a much lower, potentially less damaging and certainly less controversial transmission level for SURTASS LFA sonar. (Clark, 8/19/99) In an effort to mitigate the effects of anthropogenic sound on the marine environment instead of adding to it via LFA, why isn't the Navy providing unclassified quieting technology to commercial shipbuilders?
G. Littoral Zone Impacts
"Under Section 307 (c)(1) of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, the Navy is required to conduct SURTASS LFA sonar operations that may affect land or water uses or natural resources of the coastal zone in a manner that is consistent, to the maximum extent practicable, with the enforceable policies of the coastal zone management program of each affected state." I.e., if it "isn't practicable" for the Navy to comply with, for instance, California Coastal Commission regulations, legally mandated compliance simply will be ignored? The DEIS further states: "Also, the seaward aspects of coastal industries, including fisheries and aquaculture, would not be affected under Alternative 1 because no significant impacts are expected to the commercial or recreational fisheries stocks or related captures, trade or employment." Again, this is in direct contravention of the Navy's own Workshop: "Even if anthropogenic sounds do not affect marine mammals, this does not enable us to make the blanket statement that such sounds are inconsequential since they may affect non-mammalian species. Finally, it needs to be kept in mind that with much of the anthropogenic sounds from the Navy, commercial shipping, transportation, oil and gas operations, etc., occur primarily near shore waters, and these are the very regions of the marine environment in which these organisms are most abundant. Thus, concerns about non-mammalian species must be considered as equally valid and worthy of investigating." (WEANME, pg. 47) What effort did the Navy undertake to investigate "non-mammalian species" in "near shore waters" and the potential for LFA impacts in the littoral zone? Perhaps most importantly: "The Navy and others with related regulatory responsibilities ultimately are likely to be faced with the question -- 'is chronic exposure to anthropogenic sound from any source, or combination of sources, causing psychological or physiological stress that is reducing the average longevity or the average number of offspring produced by individual animals and thus causing a decrease in the productivity (biological fitness) or size of the affected stocks (e.g., by suppressing the immune systems of individual animals, making them more vulnerable to disease)?" (WEANME, pg. 70) What studies has the Navy undertaken to insure that LFA sonar does not cause a decrease in biological fitness, or the size of affected stocks, or the average longevity or the average number of offspring produced by individual animals? The entire "Coastal Zone Management" section declaring the operation of SURTASS LFA to have "no significant impact" on industry, marine resources research and planning, natural resources protection and preservation, and recreation is an outright falsehood in light of the Navy's proposed use of ADS (Advanced Deployable Systems).
The underpinning of the entire mitigation process of this DEIS is: ".few systems are deployed, the host ship is moving during operations, the duty cycle is low, and aggregate mission activity in any one region and season is modest." Approximately 432 hours per year per ship, per the DEIS (double for the two-source/one site scenario). Assuming this schedule can be taken at face value, why is this system being deployed at all? How can "enemy submarine activity" be detected if the system isn't running 24/7/365?
It appears the answer can be found in the following testimony given before the Senate Armed Services Committee Seapower Subcommittee on Submarine Warfare in the 21st Century, convened on 13 April 1999, which quotes RADM Malcolm I. Fages, U.S. Navy Director, Submarine Warfare, CNO (N87), and may shed a little light on why the deep-water SURTASS system may not need to be run on more than a part-time basis:
"In the integrated undersea surveillance (IUSS) area, we are developing several systems with strong potential to improve our Anti-Submarine capabilities in the littorals. Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) Twin Line operations in 1998 demonstrated the ability to detect advanced diesel submarines at substantial ranges in the littora |
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